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115 Files  
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C. J. ...  
FILES

FACILITY: BRIDGEPORT BRASS COMPANY  
30 GRAND STREET and  
KASOBY AND PULASKI STREETS  
BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

DATE:

INSPECTED BY: Richard G. Cavanaugh

PERIOD OF INSPECTION:

October 11 and 19, 1954

INSPECTION REPORT

Introduction

This is an initial report of inspection of the above subject Class "B" facilities occupied by the Bridgeport Brass Company, which is engaged in work for the Oak Ridge Operations Office under Contract AT(30-1)-1405, which calls for a program of research and development in the drawing, scalping and testing of zirconium and uranium bars.

Classified interests consist of work classified through Confidential and documents classified through Secret. Administrative offices and a pilot plant are located at 30 Grand Street, while the Kasoby and Pulaski Streets address houses a laboratory, known as the Haven AEC Metallurgical Laboratory, and a set of technical offices.

Although arrangements were made with the facility in advance by ORO for this inspector's visit, Mr. Joseph McManara, a company officer responsible for the overall security program, was unable to be present during the inspection due to his participation in negotiations with the company union, whose contract had expired. His absence limited the scope of inspection to some degree, as it is pointed out that the information set forth in this report was obtained from, or in company with, Mr. R. S. French, Project Manager for the company's AEC program in the Research Department, who is also responsible for the control of all classified documents.

All comments and recommendations that follow were thoroughly discussed with Mr. French.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that ORO re-examine the program at this facility to determine if there is now a need for a badge system for all employees and visitors participating in the AEC program at both facilities. (See page 3)

2. It is recommended that "Q" cleared employees at 30 Grand Street, who are located outside of the Research Division offices in unguarded areas be required to read classified documents within the confines of a specifically designated and restricted room under the observation of a member of Mr. French's staff, or within the Research Division offices themselves. (See page 4)

*This sounds fairly reasonable*

*visitors  
and under each  
of plants.  
2. Some at  
plant, plus  
some*

APPROVED:

COPIES TO:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Inspector

Manager, Oak Ridge Operations Office  
Director, Division of Production

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chief, Inspection & Training Branch

3. It is recommended that OSOO make certain authorization is requested for key individuals to carry classified documents off-site on official business trips in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10.c(2) of GM-SEC-5. (See page 2)

### PHYSICAL SECURITY

Headquarters administrative offices at 30 Grand Street are contained in a new, four-story administration building located in a completely fenced and well-lighted area which also encompasses a number of older buildings in which different plant operations are located. The Research Division occupies a suite of offices on the first floor of the Administration Building which is separated from other offices by eight foot partitions of metal and frosted glass.

Employees, all of whom carry a laminated photograph ID card, enter the Grand Street plant and offices on a personal recognition basis. There is no badge system in use at the facility. There are no security areas nor guard posts at Grand Street and the only access control in effect is exercised by a receptionist located in the front lobby who registers and announces visitors.

"Q" cleared guards are on duty throughout the entire plant area, around the clock, but only play a direct role in protection of the AEC program during non-working hours when all exterior doors of the Administration Building are locked and under the control of the guard force.

The staff of the Research Division assigned to the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory numbers some 15 persons at present. These employees are checked in and out daily by a guard on a personal recognition basis. This laboratory, located on the front portion of the second floor of an old Trades School Building in the factory section of Bridgeport, has three doors. One door is normally used by the personnel. A second door is locked at all times, controlled from within and used infrequently for delivery of materials. The third door is strictly for emergency use only and has been appropriately "designated" and equipped with a lead seal and "crash" type hardware. Windows on this second floor area are equipped with metal screening. The building is fenced on three sides and adequately lighted at night.

One guard is on duty around the clock at the Havens laboratory. The majority of during the work day is located at the foot of a set of stairs leading to the limited area. After working hours, the guard on duty performs a tour of the entire area in the building occupied by the Bridgeport Brass Company, checking in on a series of clock stations hourly. The guard also makes periodic contacts with his headquarters.

All visits to the Havens laboratory are approved through Mr. French's office. Laboratory personnel are notified of the visit and are required to identify the visitor at the guard desk and act as his escort after registration.

In a discussion concerning the use of identification media for employees and visitors, it was indicated by Mr. French that the subject had been a point of discussion with OSOO inspectors during past surveys made by that office and at that time it had been agreed that badges were not necessary.

It appears to this inspector that this matter should be given reconsideration due to the large number of "Q" cleared personnel now employed at the facilities and the increase in visitor traffic.

*Badges  
& Escort  
+ Consider*

It is recommended that GPO re-examine the program at this facility to determine if there is now a need for a badge system for all employees and visitors participating in the AEC program at both facilities.

It was learned from a supervisory member of the guard force responsible for the protection of the buildings at 30 Grand Street that the unit was made up of 21 men, 11 of whom were "Q" cleared. These guards do not carry firearms, are not uniformed, and the cost of their services in the AEC areas is not directly charged to the Commission but is included in overhead costs.

According to the guard supervisor, interviewed in Mr. French's presence, the guard force checks three locations at 30 Grand Street containing security interests, Mr. French's office, Mr. Williams's office on the third floor, and the pilot plant. Each office has a four-drawer, three-key combination locked repository and in Mr. French's office there is a Detex clock station which is checked hourly by the guard on duty during non-working hours. Within the pilot plant there is a wooden material storage vault equipped with a double padlock arrangement. There are no classified documents involved in the pilot plant operation and the amount of material uranium on hand never reaches the classified stage; nevertheless, there is a Detex clock station at this point which is also checked every hour.

At the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory there are four repositories in adjacent offices. These three-key combination locked cabinets are checked hourly by "Q" cleared guards of a second Bridgeport Brass guard force responsible for the protection of other company buildings, as well as the Havens Laboratory. These men also check in on Detex clock stations within the area.

Further information concerning the physical security program could not be obtained owing to the absence of Mr. Williams during the inspection.

#### DOCUMENT CONTROL

Mail is picked up from the Post Office by a company driver and delivered to the company mail room at 30 Grand Street. Registered mail addressed to Mr. French or other personnel of the Research Division is delivered unopened to Mr. French's secretary. It was noted that neither the driver, mail room personnel, nor the inner-office messenger are "Q" cleared. Mr. French's secretary enters identifying data concerning all classified documents in a log book and makes up an individual card for each document. The record maintained on documents charged out from this central file control point consists of a notation on the document card.

A large majority of the documents received are charged out to Research Division employees located in the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory who personally pick up and return these classified documents. Classified documents used by Mr. French's immediate staff and by other "Q" cleared personnel located throughout the general plant area at 30 Grand Street are charged out on a day-to-day basis. Mr. French was questioned concerning this policy which allows "Q" cleared personnel to draw classified documents from the Research Division for use in unrestricted plant areas. Though there is no overnight storage of documents in these areas, it appears there is a security weakness in that un-cleared personnel are located in the same offices with cleared employees and there are no protective measures whatsoever in effect to preclude unauthorized access except the diligence of the "Q" cleared individual. Mr. French stated that he too had been concerned with this problem and agreed that the condition did present a potential security risk.

It is recommended that "Q" cleared individuals at 30 Grand Street who are located outside of the Research Division offices in un-guarded areas be required to read classified documents within the confines of a specifically designated and restricted room under the observation of a member of Mr. French's staff or in the Research Division offices themselves.

Another procedure about which this inspector raised a question as to its propriety from a security standpoint was the lack of any type of receipt in the exchange of classified documents between Mr. French's central files and other points, especially the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory. Since there are always a large number of documents charged out, and there is no time limitation on their return, a receipt or at least an initialing of the document card appears to be in order, and it is suggested that a classified material receipt form be used to control the movement of classified documents.

According to Mr. French, an inventory of all classified documents in his records is conducted once a year and, at present, he knows of no documents that are missing. He stated that he was thoroughly familiar with the action to be taken should a document be reported as lost.

Reproduction of classified documents is accomplished by "Q" cleared personnel of the Print Shop in a completely enclosed room with one entrance which is under the direct observation of the guard at the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory. Material to be reproduced is personally exchanged between "Q" cleared personnel. Print Shop employees have a complete understanding of their responsibilities and the need for returning all paper, including scrap, at the end of the work day.

Classified waste is destroyed in accordance with existing AEC regulations by being burned in an incinerator located near the Pilot Plant by "Q" cleared guards or personnel of the Research Division.

Mr. French has received authority, in writing, to classify documents and is the only person at the facility with such authority.

Mr. French uses the Declassification Guide and written instructions from CSO for his information and guidance in the field of classification and appears to be properly versed on the subject. According to Mr. French, the AEC work at Bridgport Brass, Inc., in the past, has been classified as high as Secret, but recently a re-examination of the job prompted CSO to reduce the classification to Confidential. The need for classification of the work stems from the company's metallurgical methods used for fabrication of fuel elements, together with certain phases of the cost involved.

Mr. French stated that the need to transport classified documents off-site does arise periodically, especially in connection with visits to the company's Avian Plant; however, authorization has never been requested from Oak Ridge.

It is recommended that CSO make certain authorization is requested for key individuals to carry classified documents off-site on official business trips in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10.e.(2) of CS-22-5.

As mentioned previously, "Q" cleared personnel working at the Havens Metallurgy Laboratory personally hand-carry documents to and from Mr. French's office. Mr.

*Handwritten notes:*  
transport classified  
documents with clearance  
of business trips - as per  
OK instructions OK 2/02-09 v b, 3.

R. M. Treco, who is in charge of the work at the laboratory, has been designated as the Control Clerk for all classified documents located therein. Separate control cards are made up for RND reports which, at the present time, approximate 200, both Secret and Confidential. No classified document receipts are used in the movement of documents throughout the laboratory and none are believed necessary because of the small area involved and the fact that all offices advise one another.

Classified documents, other than RND reports, are mostly located in Mr. Treco's personal safe. Discussion with Mr. Treco disclosed there were no log records maintained for these documents, which are classified through Secret and are quite numerous.

It was suggested that an inventory be made of the documents and a card record system established which could be integrated with the present record file for RND reports.

The facility has developed written instructions on its security program for the benefit of "Q" cleared personnel. However, these "Inter-Office Communications" do not offer complete coverage of existing AEC bulletins, especially in the handling of documents and the need for reporting missing documents. This point was brought to Mr. French's attention and he stated he would take action to correct the situation.

It was noted that the facility did not have all AEC security bulletins pertinent to the program and it is suggested that ONCO take necessary steps to supply such material.

#### SECURITY EDUCATION

Mr. French explained that all newly cleared employees are given an indoctrination talk by Mr. Millmore, and also by himself if they should be reporting for work in the Research Division. Mr. French stated that he knew of no formal "on-the-job" program for security education, that the only continuing features to his knowledge were posters periodically placed on bulletin boards and the aforementioned written company communications implementing the AEC security regulations. According to Mr. French, Mr. Millmore has the responsibility for terminating employees and requiring their signature on a security termination statement.

From the discussion of this phase of the program with Mr. French, it seemed obvious that the company had little in the line of a continuing security education program, as required by current AEC regulations. However, since the responsibility rests with Mr. Millmore, the inspector was unable to obtain a first-hand report of the exact nature of the program. It is suggested that the next immediate security survey or inspection be directed toward a thorough examination of the security education program.

#### INTEGRATION PROGRAM

"Q" cleared guards check repositories containing classified documents every hour after the working day at both facilities. Administrative infractions are brought to the attention of Mr. French and are summed up in a monthly report to Mr. Millmore.

According to Mr. French and the guard supervisor, infractions are practically nil. Should a safe be left open, Mr. French would be notified and it would be his policy to return to the plant to examine the repository. Next morning,

he would discuss the matter with the individual responsible. It was suggested that if infractions did occur, a formal record be maintained indicating all action taken.

### RELATIONS

Mr. French was not conversant with this phase of the security program as it falls strictly under Mr. Malinsara's office. However, he did supply the inspectors with a copy of an "Inter-Office Communication" written by the facility to implement Chapter XIII, AEC Manual. This company issuance, written for the information of "Q" cleared personnel, reflected policy concerning the contractor's responsibility for handling classified information received from the AEC in performance of its contract and also the penalty provisions of federal statutes.

Further information should be obtained on this subject during the next survey or inspection.

### PERSONNEL CLEARANCE

Processing of requests for "Q" clearance is handled in Mr. Malinsara's office, and a copy of all clearance notifications received are forwarded to Mr. French for his files. According to Mr. Malinsara's secretary, the company has been granted 102 active "Q" clearances, while three are in process. This figure includes approximately 20 clearances for the Adrian, Michigan Plant, another AEC classified facility. There are also three "L" type clearances at Adrian.

### VISITOR CONTROL

As described under "Physical Security", there is no identification media used for visitors to these facilities. Personal identification is always required and visitors are escorted at all times. Classified visits for the past year have averaged approximately six to twelve a month. Outgoing visits of "Q" cleared employees to other AEC facilities average three to six per month.

Records of the visitor control program are on file in Mr. French's office where all requests and notifications are processed. As mentioned previously, visits to the Metallurgy Laboratory are controlled through Mr. French's office at Grand Street.

### FOREIGN TRAVEL

From information available during the inspection, there did not appear to be any implementation of AEC regulations concerning foreign travel. However, this program should be more thoroughly examined during the next survey or inspection with Mr. Malinsara.

*Action*  
1. Review program for handling requests for  
clearance for government patients in order to  
prevent from security risks to AEC. Security also  
performance security training at 3/15/48. Review to  
be in being prepared to ~~the~~ the '900' as  
a handbook discuss this survey with B. B. C.

Review on line to ~~with~~ ~~Dr. Malinsara~~ ~~be~~ ~~with~~  
Houmaulle, Director (with the ~~Director~~)

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10/1/48